Wire fraud prevention for title companies has moved from a nice-to-have policy line into a hard operational requirement. According to FBI data cited on the latest episode of Closing Market Weekly, American losses across this category of real estate fraud grew from roughly $4 billion in 2020 to $20.8 billion in 2025. For a VP or Director of Operations at a title agency, mortgage lender, or escrow firm, that shift changes the question. It is no longer whether the organization has a fraud policy. It is whether every vendor touching the closing can be held to one.
Host Phillip Hogan, CEO of Signing Services of America, sat down with Rodney Anderson, Executive Vice President and National Agency Manager at Alliant National Title Insurance Company. Anderson has spent 30 years in the title industry and is a former president of the Texas Land Title Association. His vantage point is the claims file, which is where process gaps become dollar figures.
The Settlement Agent Carries the Risk, Even When the Breach Starts Elsewhere
A common assumption in the industry is that the notary or signing agent absorbs the exposure when something goes wrong at the table. Anderson’s answer was more complicated. The settlement agent carries significant risk even when it was not the responsible party for the breach.
Part of that risk is financial. Part of it is reputational, and reputational damage does not follow the chain of fault. Anderson pointed to research showing more than half of consumers would move to a provider that had not been hit, and over 56 percent say they are unlikely to work with a company again after a fraud incident even when all funds are recovered. If a fraudulent transaction touches a title agency, a law firm, or a signing service, the stigma attaches to the name on the closing, not to the party that opened the door.
Same five years. Five times the loss.
Where the Money Actually Leaves: Cash to Close and Payoff Fraud
Anderson broke the loss categories down. Cash-to-close wire fraud, where a buyer is redirected into sending funds to a fraudulent account, accounts for over 30 percent of cases. Mortgage payoff fraud accounts for roughly another 20 percent, and it is the more dangerous of the two for an operations team, because the outgoing wire comes from the settlement side rather than from the consumer.
The exposure is national rather than regional. Anderson cited a geographic split of roughly 26 percent West, 24 percent South, 21 percent Northeast, and 17.5 percent Midwest, with Nevada and Florida flagged as the highest risk markets. He has seen cases in rural West Texas, rural Oklahoma, and Missouri. There is no market small enough to be uninteresting.
A $350,000 Case Study in What a Handoff Costs
The clearest illustration in the episode was a North Carolina cash-out refinance. The lender never met the borrower because the transaction ran online. The closing attorney was asked to complete a mail-out, so documents were sent to a local notary in another state. The notary was not a notary. The signature block had been photocopied and duplicated onto the documents.
The homeowner discovered the $350,000 loan when the servicing welcome letter arrived. The underwriter paid the loss, then pursued the settlement agent for failing to follow underwriting bulletins. The carrier initially declined, litigation followed, and the closing attorney ultimately shut down the closing side of the practice. Anderson noted that a properly conducted remote online notarization would have stopped this specific fraud outright.
Has Remote Online Notarization Made Closings Safer or Riskier
Anderson called RON net neutral from a risk standpoint. It is more convenient, and it streamlines the process, and with a qualified vendor it makes in-person impersonation considerably harder. What it does not touch is the cybersecurity layer where funds move. Wire interception happens outside the signing itself, which means a technology upgrade in the notarization step does not close the exposure in the payment step.
What to Demand From a Signing Vendor
Asked what a title company should require from any vendor in its signing process, Anderson gave a specific list. Operations leaders can use it directly as vendor due diligence criteria:
- Insurance, including cyber liability and wire fraud coverage. Anderson expects underwriters to begin requiring these the same way errors and omissions coverage moved from optional to mandatory.
- Wire fraud prevention as a stated requirement rather than an optional feature.
- Documented education, so the vendor demonstrably understands current risk levels.
- Identity verification confirming the party receiving funds is who they claim to be.
- Account ownership verification. Confirming an account exists at a major bank is not the same as confirming it belongs to the correct payoff lender or party.
- Secure communication channels for anything involving money, including multi-factor authentication and encrypted email.
- Cybersecurity monitoring software capable of flagging or blocking traffic originating from overseas IP addresses.
- Ongoing staff training, since a single click on a malicious link remains the most common entry point.
Anderson also made a point that operations leaders should underline. A verification tool is only as good as the discipline behind it. He described repeated claims where an agency held a contract with a verification vendor and simply did not use the service on a given file, usually because the parties were familiar and the additional step felt like friction on a month-end payoff.
If It Happens, Recovery Is Possible, but It Is Not a Strategy
Anderson’s incident guidance was direct. File with the FBI’s crime unit immediately, understanding that the bureau is unlikely to act below roughly $10 million. Contact the underwriter immediately rather than covering payments while attempting a private recovery. Engage the fraud recovery service attached to the relevant vendor. Time is the single biggest variable, and embarrassment is the most expensive delay in the process.
Why Single Point Accountability Matters in Vendor Selection
Every requirement on Anderson’s list assumes an owner. That is the operational argument for full process ownership in a signing service. Signing Services of America is structured so one team owns the signing from assignment to completion, with no handoffs and no gaps, across all 50 states and with notary placement in under 60 minutes. A marketplace model that routes files into an open pool distributes the work and distributes the accountability with it. When a credential does not check out, the difference between a named owner and a support queue is the difference between a caught file and a claim.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who carries the risk in a title fraud or wire fraud incident, the notary or the settlement agent?
The settlement agent carries substantial risk even when it was not the responsible party for the breach. Financial exposure can follow from failure to comply with underwriter guidelines, and reputational exposure attaches to the name on the closing regardless of where the fraud originated.
What percentage of real estate fraud involves cash-to-close wire fraud?
On the episode, cash-to-close wire fraud was cited as over 30 percent of cases, with mortgage payoff fraud accounting for roughly another 20 percent.
Has remote online notarization made closings safer?
Rodney Anderson described RON as net neutral from a risk standpoint. It makes physical impersonation significantly harder when a qualified vendor is used, but it does not address the cybersecurity layer where wire interception occurs.
What should a title company require from a signing service vendor?
Insurance including cyber and wire fraud coverage, wire fraud prevention requirements, documented education, identity verification of the party receiving funds, account ownership verification, secure communication channels with multi-factor authentication or encryption, cybersecurity monitoring, and ongoing staff training.
What are the first steps after a suspected wire fraud loss?
File with the FBI crime unit immediately, contact the title underwriter immediately rather than attempting a private recovery, and engage the fraud recovery service associated with the relevant vendor. Speed is the most important factor.